Vaudenay's cryptanalysis to Chor-Rivest cryptosystem is not applicable if the parameters p and h of the finite field are both prime integers.
Introduction
after the classical attacks ( [2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11] ). The density of Chor-Rivest cryptosystem is usually high; in fact, they are 1.077, 1.139, 1.278, and 1.280 for the parameters originally proposed in [3, 4] . Hence, the aforementioned attacks do not apply to it, but Schnorr and Hörner ( [7, 13] ) have been partially successful in breaking Chor-Rivest cryptosystem for a certain percent of keys in GF 103 12 and GF 151 16 . Remark that such parameters are still far from those originally proposed.
In the present work we consider the case of prime parameters p and h, in the range determined by the present computational limitations, which is the remaining case in Vaudenay's attack.
2 The range 10
44
< n < 10
60
Vaudenay's cryptanalysis ( [14] ) of the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem ( [3, 4] ) essentially reduces it to the case in which p as well h are both prime integers.
In this section, we analyze the prime values for p and h such that
The smoothness of n = p h −1 is equal to or less than 10 13 , i.e., the greatest prime factor of p h − 1 has 13 decimal digits at most.
Remark We should remark on the fact that the items (1), (3) and (4) imply h ≤ 31. Actually, from (3) we deduce h log p ≤ 60. If h ≥ 41, then p ≤ 29, thus contradicting (1). If h = 37, then p ∈ {37, 41, 43}, but the smoothness of n for these three cases is much bigger than 10 13 . In fact, the least one is 10 24 and it corresponds to the case p = 43. The cases h ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7} are not considered in item (2) as they provide too long public keys, violating the requirement of section 3. In fact, the least public key bit length is about 3·10 8 bits.
We denote by D the set of pairs (p, h) satisfying the conditions (1)-(4) above, the list of which is given in Table 1 . The following properties are obtained: In what follows we justify why the items (3) and (4) is small enough (in fact p = 13, h = 12, see [13] ), we know that the algorithm by Schnorr and Hörner breaks the cryptosystem for a significant number (42%-76%) of public keys chosen at random. Moreover, the greatest value for (p, h)
to which the aforementioned algorithm applies is (see [7] ) p = 151, h = 16, but only 10% of public keys are broken for these parameters.
Both cases above are not specially interesting as they are covered by Vaudenay's attack, but the method of Schnorr and Hörner can be efficient for prime values of (p, h) within the range of such authors. In any case, the number of digits of n in all the cases considered in [7] and [13] is not greater than 35.
These facts justify the choice of the pairs (p, h) satisfying the conditions (1)- (3) Item (4) is included because of computational feasibility. In fact, the running time for computing a discrete logarithm in GF (p h ) * is known to be (see [12, 
group multiplications, where n = p
r is the prime factorization of the order of the group.
Moreover, a group multiplication in GF
(p h ) * costs O (h − 1) 2 (log 2 p) 2 bit operations (cf. [1, 6.2
.1] and [10, I, §1]). Hence, if B denotes the smoothness of
n, then the previous formula allows us to estimate the running time of a discrete
In addition, if we assume that the number of bit operations per day in a standard PC is 10 12 , then in the range of item (3), we obtain B < 10 13 .
3 The key size We have searched for the prime pairs (p, h) such that 10 44 < n, h ≤ p, and the bit length of its corresponding public key is not greater than 70000.
Among these pairs, those not included in the range defined by items (1)- (4), are given in Table 2 , where d (resp. B = 10 s ) denotes the number of digits (resp. smoothness) of n. The relevant fact is that none of such pairs has a smoothness ≤ 10 13 ; i.e., the item (4) does not hold. Actually, the least value for the smoothness of such pairs is 10 18 , corresponding to p = 173, h = 29.
Conclusions
(i) A unique prime pair (p, h) exists in the range (1)-(4) and with a bit length for the public key parameters slightly greater than those proposed originally in [3, 4] ; namely, p = 409, h = 17. Moreover, we have that the number of digits of n is 45, the smoothness is 10 10 , the bit length of the corresponding public key is b 17 1 = 60546, the density of the cryptosystem for such parameters is bounded from below by 2.77, and the factorization of n is n = 409
(ii) Although Vaudenay's cryptanalysis to the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem does not include the case of prime parameters (p, h), the results above actu-ally show that the cryptosystem is useless nowadays due to the present computational limitations, which essentially affect the size of the public key and to the smoothness of n, because of the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem. 
